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The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation and Administrative Regulation

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dc.creator De Figueiredo, John M.
dc.creator De Figueiredo, Rui J. P. Jr.
dc.date 2002-06-10T15:19:34Z
dc.date 2002-06-10T15:19:34Z
dc.date 2002-06-10T15:19:44Z
dc.date.accessioned 2013-05-31T14:16:06Z
dc.date.available 2013-05-31T14:16:06Z
dc.date.issued 2013-05-31
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/715
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/jspui/handle/1721
dc.description One of the central concerns about American policy-making institutions is the degree to which political outcomes can be influenced by interested parties. While the literature on interest group strategies in particular institutions - legislative, administrative, and legal - is extensive, there is very little scholarship which examines how the interdependencies between institutions affects the strategies of groups. In this paper we examine in a formal theoretical model, how the opportunity to litigate administrative rulemaking in the courts affects the lobbying strategies of competing interest groups at the rulemaking stage. Using a resource-based view of group activity, we develop a number of important insights about each stage - which cannot be observed by examining each one in isolation. We demonstrate that lobbying effort responds to the ideology of the court, and the responsiveness of the court to resources. In particular, 1) as courts become more biased toward the status quo, interest group lobbying investments become smaller, and may be eliminated all together, 2) as interest groups become wealthier, they spend more on lobbying, and 3) as the responsiveness of courts to resources decreases, the effect it has on lobbying investments depends on the underlying ideology of the court.
dc.format 415103 bytes
dc.format application/pdf
dc.language en_US
dc.relation MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper;4247-02
dc.subject Administrative Regulation
dc.subject Litigation
dc.subject Corporate Political Strategy
dc.subject Regulation
dc.subject Lobbying
dc.subject Interest Groups
dc.subject Modelling of Political Institutions
dc.title The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation and Administrative Regulation


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