أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator McAdams, David
dc.date 2002-08-16T15:45:21Z
dc.date 2002-08-16T15:45:21Z
dc.date 2002-08-16T15:45:30Z
dc.date.accessioned 2013-05-31T18:47:06Z
dc.date.available 2013-05-31T18:47:06Z
dc.date.issued 2013-06-01
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/1598
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/jspui/handle/1721
dc.description In a large class of multi-unit auctions of identical objects that includes the uniform-price, as-bid (or discriminatory), and Vickrey auctions, a Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists in monotone pure strategies whenever there is a finite price / quantity grid and each bidder's interim expected payoff function satisfies single-crossing in own bid and type. A stronger condition, non-decreasing differences in own bid and type, is satisfied in this class of auctions given (a) independent types and (b) risk-neutral bidders with marginal values that are (c) non-decreasing in own type and have (d) non-increasing differences in own type and others' quantities. A key observation behind this analysis is that each bidder's valuation for what he wins is always modular in own bid in any multi-unit auction in which the allocation is determined by market-clearing. This paper also provides the first proof of pure strategy equilibrium existence in the uniform-price auction when bidders have multi-unit demand and values that are not private.
dc.format 346785 bytes
dc.format application/pdf
dc.language en_US
dc.relation MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper;4254-02
dc.subject Equilibrium
dc.subject Auctions
dc.title Monotone Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions


الملفات في هذه المادة

الملفات الحجم الصيغة عرض

لا توجد أي ملفات مرتبطة بهذه المادة.

هذه المادة تبدو في المجموعات التالية:

أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط