| dc.creator |
McAdams, David |
|
| dc.date |
2002-08-09T19:08:05Z |
|
| dc.date |
2002-08-09T19:08:05Z |
|
| dc.date |
2002-08-09T19:08:20Z |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2013-05-31T18:32:04Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2013-05-31T18:32:04Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2013-06-01 |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/1568 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/jspui/handle/1721 |
|
| dc.description |
An isotone pure strategy equilibrium exists in any game of incomplete information in
which (1) each player i's action set is a finite sublattice of multi-dimensional Euclidean
space, (2) types are multidimensional and atomless, and each player's interim expected
payoff function satisfies two "non-primitive conditions" whenever others adopt isotone
pure strategies: (3) single-crossing in own action and type and (4)
quasisupermodularity in own action. Similarly, given that (134) and (2') types are
multi-dimensional (with atoms) an isotone mixed strategy equilibrium exists. Conditions
(34) are satisfied in supermodular and log-supermodular games given affiliated types,
and in games with independent types in which each player's ex post payoff satisfies (a)
supermodularity in own action and (b) non-decreasing differences in own action and
type. These results also extend to games with a continuum action space when each
player's ex post payoff is also continuous in his and others' actions. |
|
| dc.format |
347053 bytes |
|
| dc.format |
application/pdf |
|
| dc.language |
en_US |
|
| dc.relation |
MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper;4248-02 |
|
| dc.subject |
Equilibrium |
|
| dc.subject |
Isotone |
|
| dc.title |
Isotone Equilibrium in Games of Incomplete Information |
|