A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Corporate Lobbying in the European Parliament

dc.creator	Pieter Bouwen
dc.date	2003
dc.date.accessioned	2013-05-30T13:41:07Z
dc.date.available	2013-05-30T13:41:07Z
dc.date.issued	2013-05-30
dc.identifier	http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2003-011.htm
dc.identifier	http://www.doaj.org/doaj?func=openurl&genre=article&issn=10275193&date=2003&volume=7&issue=&spage=11
dc.identifier.uri	http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/jspui/handle/123456789/5878
dc.description	This paper is an attempt to empirically test a theory of access that investigates the logic behind the apparent ad hoc lobbying behavior of business interests in the European Parliament. The theoretical framework tries to explain the degree of access of different organizational forms of business interest representation (companies, associations and consultants) to the European Parliament in terms of a theory of the supply and demand of "access goods". The generated hypotheses are analyzed in an empirical study of the EU financial services sector. On the basis of 14 exploratory and 27 semi-structured interviews the hypotheses are checked in the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament.
dc.publisher	ECSA-Austria
dc.source	European Integration Online Papers
dc.subject	interest intermediation
dc.subject	interest representation
dc.subject	lobbying
dc.subject	participation
dc.subject	MEPs
dc.subject	European Parliament
dc.subject	political science
dc.subject	sociology
dc.title	A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Corporate Lobbying in the European Parliament

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