Traditionally clustered around one leading "hegemonic" world currency, with the introduction of the euro the international monetary regime might become a "symmetric" dipolar system. This fundamental change would come at a time of already considerable uncertainty when, after the Asian, Russian and Latin American financial crises caused general dismay, the major institutional framework is in a constant reform process as the G7 are considering a "new financial architecture" and the IMF is facing fundamental critique. At the same time, the legal position of the ECOFIN and the ECB in the international field in the international monetary organizations is not yet clear. This article tries to point out some concrete areas of diversity of interest in the international consequences of the introduction of the Euro and analyzes the costs and gains from cooperation in different ways of dealing with these conflicts. From the structure of the issues some conclusions on the challenges facing the institutions can be drawn and some speculation as to the appropriate distribution of competences may be possible. Thus, I try to give an overview of the legal issues surrounding the representation of the EMU in the international monetary institutions in the light of a functional analysis of the challenges created by a transformation of a "hegemonic" monetary system to a "symmetric dipolar system".