أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط
dc.creator |
Sotomayor Marilda |
|
dc.date |
2002 |
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2013-05-30T10:47:23Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2013-05-30T10:47:23Z |
|
dc.date.issued |
2013-05-30 |
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dc.identifier |
http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-71402002000300006 |
|
dc.identifier |
http://www.doaj.org/doaj?func=openurl&genre=article&issn=00347140&date=2002&volume=56&issue=3&spage=497 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/jspui/handle/123456789/4192 |
|
dc.description |
This paper proposes a new descending bid method for auctioning multiple objects. The auctioneer announces a current price, bidders indicate their demands at that price, and the auctioneer lowers the prices until every object can be allocated to a buyer who demands it and no buyer receives more than one item. The features of this mechanism lie on the facts that: the objects are sold simultaneously at prices that clear the market; every two similar objects are sold at the same price; the mechanism always produces the same final price, namely, the maximum competitive equilibrium price. In addition, the auctioneer can choose an efficient allocation. |
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dc.publisher |
Fundação Getúlio Vargas |
|
dc.source |
Revista Brasileira de Economia |
|
dc.subject |
auction mechanism |
|
dc.subject |
competitive equilibrium |
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dc.subject |
demand set |
|
dc.title |
A simultaneous descending bid auction for multiple items and unitary demand |
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الملفات في هذه المادة
لا توجد أي ملفات مرتبطة بهذه المادة.
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هذه المادة تبدو في المجموعات التالية:
أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط