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Recent discussion of a 'multi-tiered', 'different-speed', 'many-cores' Europe, and even 'first- and 'second-class' European 'citizenship', suggests that the process of European integration is not as uniform as it was thought to be. From the time of the ancient Greek polis, the nature of politics has been based on the delimitation and regulation of social space.[1] Consequently, one of the main problems of politics, that of exclusion and repression of difference, results from concentration on one or another political issue, by making it right, valuable and central to the socio-political reality. Thus the accession of the three Baltic States to the EU creates a certain controversy over the recently regained sovereignty of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, in that it takes away the centrality of national politics in favour of supranational ones. This is happening for at least two reasons. First, their post-Soviet sovereignty conflicts with the EU's post-modern multi-level governance and fluctuating borders (despite these states having multiple membership in various inter-governmental regional bodies around the Baltic rim).[2] Indeed, for the last decade, in order to break away from their post-colonial communist legacies, EU's new members – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, – have been shaping their 'return' to the 'family of civilized nations' through use of the restrictive geopolitical vocabulary of modernity. As a result, the introduction of strict citizenship laws and the tightening of border controls failed to take into account the well-being of the Russian-speaking population in certain Baltic regions.[3] Secondly, identity is changing from one defined simply by nationality, to one defined by membership of supra-national and extra-territorial organisations operating in a regional-global dichotomy of international space.[4] In short, the three Baltic republics could be faced with a real problem: although primarily integrated into the 'New Europe' via their national government institutions and policies, in the years of adaptation to the European supranationalism that would follow, they would not be able to achieve sufficient levels of inter-regional and intra-regional integration and co-operation with the more advanced European regions. Having each quickly built national edifices of modern state on the ruins of state socialism, but unable to achieve full regional and social cohesiveness which characterises other European nations, the ethnically diverse population of the Baltic countries would not be able to face competitiveness within the 'Europe of regions' and fulfil their own development potential. |
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