أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Bickenbach, Frank
dc.creator Williams, Iestyn
dc.date 1996
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T06:09:49Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T06:09:49Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/885
dc.identifier ppn:198051816
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/885
dc.description In this paper we consider the impact of vertical integration on a retailer's choices of product variety and specific, brand-supporting investment. In an incomplete contract environment, vertical merger encourages investment in integrated supply, and foreclosure of non-integrated manufacturers. Anti-competitive as opposed to efficiency interpretations depend delicately on a trade-off between the benefits of supplier-specific rather than generally applicable retailer investment, and the value of multi-product rather than single product retailing. Where retailers compete, it is shown that vertical integration implements competition reducing, product differentiating investment strategies.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) Kiel
dc.relation Kiel Working Papers 734
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject L22
dc.subject L12
dc.subject L4
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject incomplete contracts
dc.subject vertical integration
dc.subject monopolization
dc.subject Vertikale Konzentration
dc.subject Unvollständiger Vertrag
dc.subject Einzelhandel
dc.subject Sortiment
dc.subject Wettbewerbstheorie
dc.subject Wirtschaftliche Effizienz
dc.subject Theorie
dc.title Investment specificity, vertical integration and market foreclosure
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


الملفات في هذه المادة

الملفات الحجم الصيغة عرض

لا توجد أي ملفات مرتبطة بهذه المادة.

هذه المادة تبدو في المجموعات التالية:

أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط