dc.creator |
Bickenbach, Frank |
|
dc.creator |
Williams, Iestyn |
|
dc.date |
1996 |
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2013-10-16T06:09:49Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2013-10-16T06:09:49Z |
|
dc.date.issued |
2013-10-16 |
|
dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/885 |
|
dc.identifier |
ppn:198051816 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/885 |
|
dc.description |
In this paper we consider the impact of vertical integration on a retailer's choices of product variety and specific, brand-supporting investment. In an incomplete contract environment, vertical merger encourages investment in integrated supply, and foreclosure of non-integrated manufacturers. Anti-competitive as opposed to efficiency interpretations depend delicately on a trade-off between the benefits of supplier-specific rather than generally applicable retailer investment, and the value of multi-product rather than single product retailing. Where retailers compete, it is shown that vertical integration implements competition reducing, product differentiating investment strategies. |
|
dc.language |
eng |
|
dc.publisher |
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) Kiel |
|
dc.relation |
Kiel Working Papers 734 |
|
dc.rights |
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen |
|
dc.subject |
L22 |
|
dc.subject |
L12 |
|
dc.subject |
L4 |
|
dc.subject |
ddc:330 |
|
dc.subject |
incomplete contracts |
|
dc.subject |
vertical integration |
|
dc.subject |
monopolization |
|
dc.subject |
Vertikale Konzentration |
|
dc.subject |
Unvollständiger Vertrag |
|
dc.subject |
Einzelhandel |
|
dc.subject |
Sortiment |
|
dc.subject |
Wettbewerbstheorie |
|
dc.subject |
Wirtschaftliche Effizienz |
|
dc.subject |
Theorie |
|
dc.title |
Investment specificity, vertical integration and market foreclosure |
|
dc.type |
doc-type:workingPaper |
|