DSpace Repository

The German model of corporate governance: Basic features, critical issues, and applicability to transition economies

Show simple item record

dc.creator Nunnenkamp, Peter
dc.date 1995
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T06:16:40Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T06:16:40Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/855
dc.identifier ppn:19095597X
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/855
dc.description The paper briefly sketches alternative models of dealing with principal-agent problems and compares major characteristics of bank-oriented versus marketoriented systems of corporate governance. The ownership structure in Germany is contrasted with evidence for other industrial countries. This forms the basis on which some critical issues of the German model of corporate governance are discussed. The analysis focuses on the role of banks in enterprise control, and on the limits which cross-shareholdings and the system of co-determination may impose on the effectiveness of outsider control. The pros and cons of the German model are evaluated in comparison with alternative systems. Finally, it is discussed whether transition economies are well advised to follow this model rather than market-based systems of corporate control.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) Kiel
dc.relation Kiel Working Papers 713
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject Eigentümerstruktur
dc.subject Agency Theory
dc.subject Bank
dc.subject Wirtschaftskonzentration
dc.subject Deutschland
dc.title The German model of corporate governance: Basic features, critical issues, and applicability to transition economies
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


Files in this item

Files Size Format View

There are no files associated with this item.

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

Search DSpace


Advanced Search

Browse

My Account