المستودع الأكاديمي جامعة المدينة

Selfish-biased conditional cooperation: On the decline of contributions in repeated public goods experiments

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dc.creator Neugebauer, Tibor
dc.creator Perote, Javier
dc.creator Schmidt, Ulrich
dc.creator Loos, Malte
dc.date 2007
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T06:09:45Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T06:09:45Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/4066
dc.identifier ppn:543700062
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/4066
dc.description In the recent literature, several hypotheses have been put forward in order to explain the decline of contributions in repeated public good games. We present results of an experiment which allows to evaluate these hypotheses. The main characteristics of our experimental design are a variation of information feedback and an elicitation of individual beliefs about others' contributions. Altogether, our data support the hypothesis of conditional cooperation with a selfish bias.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) Kiel
dc.relation Kieler Arbeitspapiere 1376
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject C72
dc.subject C92
dc.subject H41
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject Experimental economics
dc.subject Information feedback
dc.subject Public goods
dc.subject Voluntary contributions
dc.subject Conditional cooperation
dc.subject Öffentliches Gut
dc.subject Nichtkooperatives Spiel
dc.subject Wiederholte Spiele
dc.subject Eigeninteresse
dc.subject Experiment
dc.subject Theorie
dc.title Selfish-biased conditional cooperation: On the decline of contributions in repeated public goods experiments
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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