أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Díaz-Vázquez, Pilar
dc.creator Snower, Dennis J.
dc.date 2003
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T06:16:40Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T06:16:40Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier German economic review 1465-6485 4 2003 2 139-150
dc.identifier doi:10.1111/1468-0475.00076
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/2992
dc.identifier ppn:365307750
dc.identifier RePEc:zbw:ifwkie:2992
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/2992
dc.description Do firms reduce employment when their insiders (established, incumbent employees) claim higher wages? The conventional answer in the theoretical literature is that insider power has no influence on employment, provided that the newly hired employees (entrants) receive their reservation wages. The reason given is that an increase in insider wages gives rise to a countervailing fall in reservation wages, leaving the present value of wage costs unchanged. Our analysis contradicts this conventional answer. We show that, in the context of a stochastic model of the labor market, an increase in insider wages promotes firing in recessions, while leaving hiring in booms unchanged. Thereby insider power reduces average employment.
dc.language eng
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject J21
dc.subject J23
dc.subject J31
dc.subject J32
dc.subject J33
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject Employment
dc.subject Wage determination
dc.subject market power
dc.subject insiders
dc.subject hiring and firing costs
dc.subject Lohnstruktur
dc.subject Insider-Outsider-Modell
dc.subject Arbeitsuche
dc.subject Anspruchslohn
dc.subject Marktmacht
dc.subject Theorie
dc.title Can insider power affect employment?
dc.type doc-type:article


الملفات في هذه المادة

الملفات الحجم الصيغة عرض

لا توجد أي ملفات مرتبطة بهذه المادة.

هذه المادة تبدو في المجموعات التالية:

أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط