DSpace Repository

Contracting with Private Information

Show simple item record

dc.creator Hagedorn, Marcus
dc.date 2003
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:11:38Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:11:38Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20647
dc.identifier ppn:362044813
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20647
dc.description This paper adds to the current literature on incomplete contracting that argues that deviating from a complete information, transaction-cost free environment may be may generate valuable insights. We achieve this by assuming bargaining with asymmetric information. We consider the consequences of asymmetric information for investment decisions and for the assignment of property rights. This analysis is crucial since any foundation must ensure that results of the kind derived by Grossman, Hart and Moore still hold. It is shown that investment incentives are guided by an additional element to standard hold-up models since the outcome of bargaining depends directly on the investment level. This may for example result in cooperative overinvestment. Although investment incentives are always positive from a social perspective, they can be negative from an individual's perspective. In our model, property rights are shown to still play a role. This arises from their tight interaction with ex-post bargaining. Optimal ownership structures are characterized and a new role for option contracts is identified.
dc.language eng
dc.relation IZA Discussion paper series 690
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject D82
dc.subject D81
dc.subject D23
dc.subject L14
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject private values
dc.subject ownership
dc.subject property rights
dc.subject incomplete contracts
dc.subject hold-up
dc.subject Unvollständiger Vertrag
dc.subject Asymmetrische Information
dc.subject Verhandlungstheorie
dc.subject Betriebliche Investitionspolitik
dc.subject Eigentumsrechtstheorie
dc.subject Theorie
dc.title Contracting with Private Information
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper

Files in this item

Files Size Format View

There are no files associated with this item.

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

Search DSpace

Advanced Search


My Account