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Tax Evasion and Social Interactions

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dc.creator Fortin, Bernard
dc.creator Lacroix, Guy
dc.creator Villeval, Marie-Claire
dc.date 2004
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:11:31Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:11:31Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20630
dc.identifier ppn:47529260X
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20630
dc.description The paper extends the standard tax evasion model by allowing for social interactions. In Manski?s (1993) nomenclature, our model takes into account social conformity effects (i.e., endogenous interactions), fairness effects (i.e., exogenous interactions) and sorting effects (i.e., correlated effects). Our model is tested using experimental data. Participants must decide how much income to report given their tax rate and audit probability, and given those faced by the other members of their group as well as their mean reported income. The estimation is based on a two-limit simultaneous tobit with fixed group effects. A unique social equilibrium exists when the model satisfies coherency conditions. In line with Brock and Durlauf (2001b), the intrinsic nonlinearity between individual and group responses is sufficient to identify the model without imposing any exclusion restrictions. Our results are consistent with fairness effects but reject social conformity and correlated effects.
dc.language eng
dc.relation IZA Discussion paper series 1359
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject Z13
dc.subject C92
dc.subject C24
dc.subject D63
dc.subject H26
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject social interactions
dc.subject tax evasion
dc.subject simultaneous tobit
dc.subject laboratory experiments
dc.subject Steuerkriminalität
dc.subject Soziale Beziehungen
dc.subject Soziale Norm
dc.subject Gerechtigkeit
dc.subject Experiment
dc.title Tax Evasion and Social Interactions
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper

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