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Incentives in Tournaments with Endogenous Prize Selection

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dc.creator Harbring, Christine
dc.creator Irlenbusch, Bernd
dc.date 2004
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:11:25Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:11:25Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20609
dc.identifier ppn:474242978
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20609
dc.description Tournament incentive schemes offer payments dependent on relative performance and thereby are intended to motivate agents to exert productive effort. Unfortunately, however, an agent may also be tempted to destroy the production of his competitors in order to improve the own relative position. In the present study we investigate whether this sabotage problem is mitigated in a repeated interaction between the agents and the principal. As sabotage can hardly be observed in real-world organizations we employ a controlled experiment. Our data provide clear evidence that agents? behavior is not only guided by competition between agents but also by the possibility to punish the principal via sabotage.
dc.language eng
dc.relation IZA Discussion paper series 1340
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject J41
dc.subject J33
dc.subject D23
dc.subject C72
dc.subject L23
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject relative performance evaluation
dc.subject personnel economics
dc.subject sabotage
dc.subject reciprocity
dc.subject experiments
dc.subject Leistungsanreiz
dc.subject Wettbewerb
dc.subject Agency Theory
dc.subject Wirtschaftskriminalität
dc.subject Experiment
dc.subject Tournament
dc.title Incentives in Tournaments with Endogenous Prize Selection
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper

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