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Punishing Free-Riders : How Group Size Affects Mutual Monitoring and the Provision of Public Goods

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dc.creator Carpenter, Jeffrey P.
dc.date 2004
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:11:24Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:11:24Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20606
dc.identifier ppn:474215571
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20606
dc.description Because costly punishment is not credible, subgame perfection suggests that punishment will not deter free riding, regardless of the size or structure of groups. However, experiments show that people will punish free riders, even at considerable cost. To examine the implications of agents who punish, we simulate an environment populated with behavioral strategies seen in the lab and use the simulation to develop hypotheses about why group size should matter when punishment is allowed. We test these hypotheses experimentally and examine whether the effect of group size is purely due to the number of group members or if information about other group members is what is important. We find that large groups contribute at rates no lower than small groups because punishment does not fall appreciably in large groups. However, hindrances to monitoring do reduce the provision of the public good.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation IZA Discussion paper series 1337
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject C92
dc.subject C72
dc.subject H41
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject public goods
dc.subject punishment
dc.subject group size
dc.subject experiment
dc.subject simulation
dc.subject Öffentliches Gut
dc.subject Trittbrettfahrerverhalten
dc.subject Strafe
dc.subject Gruppenentscheidung
dc.subject Kontrolle
dc.subject Experiment
dc.title Punishing Free-Riders : How Group Size Affects Mutual Monitoring and the Provision of Public Goods
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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