| dc.creator |
Roider, Andreas |
|
| dc.date |
2004 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2013-10-16T07:11:10Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2013-10-16T07:11:10Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2013-10-16 |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20564 |
|
| dc.identifier |
ppn:464451868 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20564 |
|
| dc.description |
The present paper aims to contribute to the literature on the foundations of incomplete contracts by providing conditions under which simple delegation of authority is the solution to the complete-contracting problem of the parties. We consider a hold-up framework where both parties profit from an investment that raises the value of an asset. Delegation turns out to be optimal if (i) the decision-dependent parts of the payoffs of the parties are linear in the asset value, and (ii) decisions have no investment-independent effect. If overinvestment might be an issue, delegation, however, with restricted competencies is optimal if some additional continuity requirements are met. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.publisher |
|
|
| dc.relation |
IZA Discussion paper series 1298 |
|
| dc.rights |
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen |
|
| dc.subject |
L14 |
|
| dc.subject |
D23 |
|
| dc.subject |
D82 |
|
| dc.subject |
L22 |
|
| dc.subject |
ddc:330 |
|
| dc.subject |
delegation |
|
| dc.subject |
decentralization |
|
| dc.subject |
authority |
|
| dc.subject |
incomplete contracts |
|
| dc.subject |
hold-up |
|
| dc.subject |
property rights |
|
| dc.subject |
Kooperative Führung |
|
| dc.subject |
Dezentrale Organisation |
|
| dc.subject |
Unvollständiger Vertrag |
|
| dc.subject |
Eigentumsrechtstheorie |
|
| dc.subject |
Investition |
|
| dc.subject |
Sunk Costs |
|
| dc.subject |
Theorie |
|
| dc.title |
Delegation of Authority as an Optimal (In)complete Contract |
|
| dc.type |
doc-type:workingPaper |
|