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Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Applications

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dc.creator Albrecht, James
dc.creator Gautier, Pieter A.
dc.creator Vroman, Susan
dc.date 2003
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:10:45Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:10:45Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20487
dc.identifier ppn:360941273
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20487
dc.description We analyze a model of directed search in which unemployed job seekers observe all posted wages. We allow for the possibility of multiple applications by workers and ex post competition among vacancies. For any number of applications, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in which vacancies post a common wage. When workers apply to only one vacancy, a single wage is paid and the resulting equilibrium is efficient. When workers make multiple applications, there is dispersion in wages paid, and equilibrium may be inefficient. We show that our results also hold in a steady-state version of the model.
dc.language eng
dc.relation IZA Discussion paper series 719
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject J41
dc.subject D83
dc.subject J64
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject job search
dc.subject directed search
dc.subject matching
dc.subject Arbeitsplatzsuchmodell
dc.subject Offene Stellen
dc.subject Matching
dc.subject Lohntheorie
dc.subject Theorie
dc.title Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Applications
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper

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