| dc.creator |
Wallace, Brian |
|
| dc.creator |
Seltzer, Andrew J. |
|
| dc.creator |
Huck, Steffen |
|
| dc.date |
2004 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2013-10-16T07:10:31Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2013-10-16T07:10:31Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2013-10-16 |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20439 |
|
| dc.identifier |
ppn:390285358 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20439 |
|
| dc.description |
This paper examines the relationship between firms? wage offers and workers? supply of effort using a three-period experiment. In equilibrium, firms will offer deferred compensation: first period productivity is positive and wages are zero, while third period productivity is zero and wages are positive. The experiment produces strong evidence that deferred compensation increases worker effort; in about 70 percent of cases subjects supplied the optimal effort given the wage offer, and there was a strong effort response to future-period wages. We also find some evidence of gift exchange; worker players increased the effort levels in response to above equilibrium wage offers by a human, but not in response to similar offers by a computer. Finally, we find that firm players who are initially hesitant to defer compensation learn over time that it is beneficial to do so. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.publisher |
|
|
| dc.relation |
IZA Discussion paper series 1193 |
|
| dc.rights |
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen |
|
| dc.subject |
M51 |
|
| dc.subject |
J41 |
|
| dc.subject |
J31 |
|
| dc.subject |
C91 |
|
| dc.subject |
M52 |
|
| dc.subject |
ddc:330 |
|
| dc.subject |
deferred compensation |
|
| dc.subject |
pensions |
|
| dc.subject |
experimental labor economics |
|
| dc.subject |
personnel economics |
|
| dc.subject |
gift exchange |
|
| dc.subject |
incentives |
|
| dc.subject |
shirking |
|
| dc.subject |
Vergütungssystem |
|
| dc.subject |
Betriebliche Altersversorgung |
|
| dc.subject |
Betriebliche Sozialleistungen |
|
| dc.subject |
Leistungsanreiz |
|
| dc.subject |
Anreizvertrag |
|
| dc.subject |
Spieltheorie |
|
| dc.subject |
Experiment |
|
| dc.subject |
Theorie |
|
| dc.title |
Deferred Compensation and Gift Exchange : An Experimental Investigation into Multi-Period Labor Markets |
|
| dc.type |
doc-type:workingPaper |
|