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Consumption and Savings with Unemployment Risk : Implications for Optimal Employment Contracts

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dc.creator Pissarides, Christopher A.
dc.date 2004
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:10:27Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:10:27Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20423
dc.identifier ppn:389194298
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20423
dc.description This paper derives optimal employment contracts when workers are risk averse and there are employment and unemployment risks. Without income insurance, consumption rises during employment and falls during unemployment. Optimal employment contracts offer severance compensation and sometimes give notice before dismissal. Severance compensation smoothes consumption during employment but dismissal delays insure partially against the unemployment risk because of moral hazard. During the delay consumption falls to give incentives to the worker to search for another job. No dismissal delays are optimal if exogenous unemployment compensation is sufficiently generous.
dc.language eng
dc.relation IZA Discussion paper series 1183
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject E24
dc.subject J32
dc.subject J33
dc.subject E21
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject employment risk
dc.subject unemployment risk
dc.subject severance compensation
dc.subject notice of dismissal
dc.subject Arbeitsvertrag
dc.subject Arbeitslosenversicherung
dc.subject Arbeitslosigkeit
dc.subject Risiko
dc.subject Konsum
dc.subject Arbeitskräfte
dc.subject Arbeitsmarkttheorie
dc.title Consumption and Savings with Unemployment Risk : Implications for Optimal Employment Contracts
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper

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