المستودع الأكاديمي جامعة المدينة

Legal Restrictions on Buyout Fees : Theory and Evidence from German Soccer

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dc.creator Muehlheusser, Gerd
dc.creator Frick, Bernd
dc.creator Feess, Eberhard
dc.date 2004
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:10:27Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:10:27Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20420
dc.identifier ppn:389184047
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20420
dc.description We perform a theoretical and empirical analysis of the impact of transfer fee regulations on professional soccer in Europe. Based on a model on the interaction of moral hazard and heterogeneity, we show (i) how the regulations effect contract durations and wages, (ii) that contracting parties have an incentive to agree upon inefficiently long contracts, (iii) how these incentives vary with the legal system, and (iv) how the relationship between contract duration and performance also depends on the legal system. With one exception, all theoretical results are empirically confirmed using a comprehensive data set from the top German Soccer League ("Bundesliga").
dc.language eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation IZA Discussion paper series 1180
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject J41
dc.subject L83
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject Labor contracts
dc.subject Bosman judgement
dc.subject empirical contract theory
dc.subject Sportler
dc.subject Fussballsport
dc.subject Arbeitsvertrag
dc.subject Lohn
dc.subject Abfindung
dc.subject Verhandlungstheorie
dc.subject Schätzung
dc.subject Deutschland
dc.title Legal Restrictions on Buyout Fees : Theory and Evidence from German Soccer
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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