المستودع الأكاديمي جامعة المدينة

Executive Compensation and Competition in the Banking and Financial Sectors

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dc.creator Guadalupe, Maria
dc.creator Cuñat, Vicente
dc.date 2004
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:10:11Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:10:11Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20358
dc.identifier ppn:386725497
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20358
dc.description This paper studies the effect of product market competition on the compensation packages that firms offer to their executives and in particular its impact on the sensitivity of pay to performance. To measure the effect of competition we use two different identification strategies on a panel of US executives. We exploit two deregulation episodes in the banking and financial sectors as quasi-natural experiments. We provide difference in differences estimates of the effect of competition on estimated performance-pay sensitivities and on the sensitivity of stock option grants. Our results indicate that a higher level of product market competition increases the performance pay sensitivity of executive compensation schemes.
dc.language eng
dc.relation IZA Discussion paper series 1123
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject J31
dc.subject M52
dc.subject L1
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject executive compensation
dc.subject product market competition
dc.subject performance related pay
dc.subject Leistungsorientierte Vergütung
dc.subject Führungskräfte
dc.subject Bank
dc.subject Finanzsektor
dc.subject Wettbewerb
dc.subject Schätzung
dc.subject Vereinigte Staaten
dc.title Executive Compensation and Competition in the Banking and Financial Sectors
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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