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Smuggling Humans: A Theory of Debt-Financed Migration

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dc.creator Friebel, Guido
dc.creator Guriev, Sergei
dc.date 2004
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:09:36Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:09:36Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20260
dc.identifier ppn:37932931X
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20260
dc.description We introduce financial constraints in a theoretical analysis of illegal immigration. Intermediaries finance the migration costs of wealth-constrained migrants, who enter temporary servitude contracts to pay back the debt. These debt/labor contracts are more easily enforceable in the illegal than in the legal sector of the host country. Hence, when moving from the illegal to the legal sector becomes more costly, for instance, because of stricter deportation policies, fewer immigrants default on debt. This reduces the risks for intermediaries, who are then more willing to finance illegal migration. Stricter deportation policies may thus increase rather than decrease the ex ante flow of illegal migrants. We also show that stricter deportation policies worsen the skill composition of immigrants. While stricter border controls decrease overall immigration, they may also result in an increase of debt-financed migration.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation IZA Discussion paper series 1025
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject N21
dc.subject J61
dc.subject O17
dc.subject O15
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject illegal migration
dc.subject wealth constraints
dc.subject indentured servitude
dc.subject financial contracting
dc.subject Illegale Einwanderung
dc.subject Private Verschuldung
dc.subject Verschuldungsrestriktion
dc.subject Arbeitsvertrag
dc.subject Migrationspolitik
dc.subject Theorie
dc.title Smuggling Humans: A Theory of Debt-Financed Migration
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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