أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Epstein, Gil S.
dc.creator Nitzan, Shmuel
dc.date 2004
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:09:36Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:09:36Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20258
dc.identifier ppn:37932797X
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20258
dc.description By the well established tournament literature, incomplete information regarding the employees? productivity is essential for the rationalization of (efficiency-enhancing) tournaments. In this paper we propose an alternative rationalization of tournaments focusing on a fully informed principal whose objective is to maximize a weighted average of the profitability (productivity) of his team and of the promotion-seeking efforts of his employees. Our first main result clarifies the conditions under which the principal has an incentive to create a tournament that determines the promoted employee. We then examine the effect of the employees' productivity on their probability of promotion and on the extent of the resources wasted in the tournament. In particular, we specify the conditions that ensure that the most productive employee (the natural candidate for promotion) is less likely to be promoted and the conditions under which higher employee's productivity results in increased wasted promotion-seeking efforts.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation IZA Discussion paper series 1023
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject J2
dc.subject D71
dc.subject D2
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject tournaments
dc.subject promotion
dc.subject Agency Theory
dc.subject Wettbewerb
dc.subject Erwerbsverlauf
dc.subject Theorie
dc.subject Tournament
dc.title Tournaments: There Is More Than Meets the Eye
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط