المستودع الأكاديمي جامعة المدينة

Profit Sharing, Credit Market Imperfections and Equilibrium Unemployment

أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Koskela, Erkki
dc.creator Stenbacka, Rune
dc.date 2004
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:09:36Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:09:36Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20255
dc.identifier ppn:378963260
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20255
dc.description We investigate the interaction between labour and credit market imperfections for equilibrium unemployment in the presence of profit sharing. In a partial equilibrium with exogenous outside options increased bargaining power of banks has adverse employment effects. In a general equilibrium with endogenous outside options this relationship is frequently reversed; reduced credit market imperfections increase equilibrium unemployment if the labour market imperfections – measured by the bargaining power of trade unions - are sufficiently strong and benefit-replacement ratio high enough. Finally, we show that higher bankruptcy risks increase equilibrium unemployment under similar conditions.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation IZA Discussion paper series 1020
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject G32
dc.subject J41
dc.subject J51
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject wage and loan bargaining
dc.subject compensation systems
dc.subject equilibrium unemployment
dc.subject outside options
dc.subject Theorie der Arbeitslosigkeit
dc.subject Gleichgewicht
dc.subject Tarifliche Gewinnbeteiligung
dc.subject Kreditmarkt
dc.subject Unvollkommener Markt
dc.subject Lohnverhandlungstheorie
dc.subject Theorie
dc.title Profit Sharing, Credit Market Imperfections and Equilibrium Unemployment
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


الملفات في هذه المادة

الملفات الحجم الصيغة عرض

لا توجد أي ملفات مرتبطة بهذه المادة.

هذه المادة تبدو في المجموعات التالية:

أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط