أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Rodríguez-Planas, Núria
dc.date 2004
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:09:30Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:09:30Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20245
dc.identifier ppn:378764985
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20245
dc.description Temporary layoffs are an important feature of the United States labor market. If these employer-employee relationships exist because of valuable job-matches, unemployment among high-productivity laid-off workers may be optimal from societal perspective. However, because of asymmetric information, low-productivity workers may behave strategically, and choose unemployment instead of low-wage jobs, resulting in an inefficient level of unemployment. This paper shows that in such cases, a re-employment bonus may give the correct incentives to laid-off workers and achieve the optimal equilibrium. The paper analyzes the equity properties of such a policy and its cost effectiveness. Finally, the model fits the data and offers several policy implications.
dc.language eng
dc.relation IZA Discussion paper series 1010
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject J63
dc.subject J65
dc.subject J64
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject temporary layoffs
dc.subject recall expectations
dc.subject unemployment
dc.subject signalling and re-employment bonus demonstrations
dc.subject Friktionelle Arbeitslosigkeit
dc.subject Arbeitsproduktivität
dc.subject Signalling
dc.subject Arbeitsmarktpolitik
dc.subject Arbeitsuche
dc.subject Theorie
dc.title Re-Employment Bonuses in a Signalling Model of Temporary Layoffs
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط