| dc.creator |
Rodríguez-Planas, Núria |
|
| dc.date |
2004 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2013-10-16T07:09:30Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2013-10-16T07:09:30Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2013-10-16 |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20245 |
|
| dc.identifier |
ppn:378764985 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20245 |
|
| dc.description |
Temporary layoffs are an important feature of the United States labor market. If these employer-employee relationships exist because of valuable job-matches, unemployment among high-productivity laid-off workers may be optimal from societal perspective. However, because of asymmetric information, low-productivity workers may behave strategically, and choose unemployment instead of low-wage jobs, resulting in an inefficient level of unemployment. This paper shows that in such cases, a re-employment bonus may give the correct incentives to laid-off workers and achieve the optimal equilibrium. The paper analyzes the equity properties of such a policy and its cost effectiveness. Finally, the model fits the data and offers several policy implications. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.relation |
IZA Discussion paper series 1010 |
|
| dc.rights |
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen |
|
| dc.subject |
J63 |
|
| dc.subject |
J65 |
|
| dc.subject |
J64 |
|
| dc.subject |
ddc:330 |
|
| dc.subject |
temporary layoffs |
|
| dc.subject |
recall expectations |
|
| dc.subject |
unemployment |
|
| dc.subject |
signalling and re-employment bonus demonstrations |
|
| dc.subject |
Friktionelle Arbeitslosigkeit |
|
| dc.subject |
Arbeitsproduktivität |
|
| dc.subject |
Signalling |
|
| dc.subject |
Arbeitsmarktpolitik |
|
| dc.subject |
Arbeitsuche |
|
| dc.subject |
Theorie |
|
| dc.title |
Re-Employment Bonuses in a Signalling Model of Temporary Layoffs |
|
| dc.type |
doc-type:workingPaper |
|