dc.creator |
Blázquez, Maite |
|
dc.creator |
Jansen, Marcel |
|
dc.date |
2003 |
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2013-10-16T07:09:20Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2013-10-16T07:09:20Z |
|
dc.date.issued |
2013-10-16 |
|
dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20204 |
|
dc.identifier |
ppn:377473693 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20204 |
|
dc.description |
This paper analyses the efficiency of the equilibrium allocation in a matching model with two types of workers and jobs. The basic assumption is that high-skill workers can perform both skilled and unskilled jobs, while low-skill workers can only perform unskilled jobs. Our first result shows that the equilibrium with ex-post bargaining is never efficient. Second, under Hosios? (1990) condition we show that high-skill workers are under-valued in equilibrium, while the opposite holds for low-skill workers. Firms therefore tend to create too few unskilled jobs, resulting in a suboptimally high unemployment rate for low-skill workers. We show that these results generalize to environments with more types of agents and different production technologies. Finally, in an extension we derive a tax scheme that restores efficiency and we show how workers? bargaining strength affects unemployment and skill-mismatch. |
|
dc.language |
eng |
|
dc.relation |
IZA Discussion paper series 968 |
|
dc.rights |
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen |
|
dc.subject |
D61 |
|
dc.subject |
C78 |
|
dc.subject |
J64 |
|
dc.subject |
ddc:330 |
|
dc.subject |
matching |
|
dc.subject |
ex post bargaining |
|
dc.subject |
heterogeneity |
|
dc.subject |
efficiency |
|
dc.subject |
Arbeitsmarkttheorie |
|
dc.subject |
Matching |
|
dc.subject |
Qualifikation |
|
dc.subject |
Verhandlungstheorie |
|
dc.subject |
Hochqualifizierte Arbeitskräfte |
|
dc.subject |
Ungelernte Arbeitskräfte |
|
dc.subject |
Allokationseffizienz |
|
dc.subject |
Theorie |
|
dc.title |
Efficiency in a matching model with heterogeneous agents : too many good or bad jobs? |
|
dc.type |
doc-type:workingPaper |
|