أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Irlenbusch, Bernd
dc.creator Sliwka, Dirk
dc.date 2003
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:08:50Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:08:50Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20126
dc.identifier ppn:371985439
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20126
dc.description The impact of transparency on the extent of reciprocal behavior is investigated in a simple repeated gift exchange experiment, where principals set wages and agents respond by choosing effort levels. In addition to the efforts the principals? payoffs are determined by a random component. It is shown that direct reciprocal behavior is much stronger in a more transparent situation where efforts are revealed to the principals. However, there is no significant impact of transparency on average effort as non-transparency leads to a stronger diversity in behavioral patterns such that at the same time the frequency of very low and very large effort levels increases.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation IZA Discussion paper series 887
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject C72
dc.subject J33
dc.subject C91
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject transparency
dc.subject reciprocity
dc.subject reputation
dc.subject gift exchange
dc.subject inequity aversion
dc.subject Arbeitsvertrag
dc.subject Agency Theory
dc.subject Nichtkooperatives Spiel
dc.subject Gerechtigkeit
dc.subject Experiment
dc.subject Theorie
dc.title Transparency and Reciprocal Behavior in Employment Relations
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط