| dc.creator |
Irlenbusch, Bernd |
|
| dc.creator |
Sliwka, Dirk |
|
| dc.date |
2003 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2013-10-16T07:08:50Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2013-10-16T07:08:50Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2013-10-16 |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20126 |
|
| dc.identifier |
ppn:371985439 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20126 |
|
| dc.description |
The impact of transparency on the extent of reciprocal behavior is investigated in a simple repeated gift exchange experiment, where principals set wages and agents respond by choosing effort levels. In addition to the efforts the principals? payoffs are determined by a random component. It is shown that direct reciprocal behavior is much stronger in a more transparent situation where efforts are revealed to the principals. However, there is no significant impact of transparency on average effort as non-transparency leads to a stronger diversity in behavioral patterns such that at the same time the frequency of very low and very large effort levels increases. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.publisher |
|
|
| dc.relation |
IZA Discussion paper series 887 |
|
| dc.rights |
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen |
|
| dc.subject |
C72 |
|
| dc.subject |
J33 |
|
| dc.subject |
C91 |
|
| dc.subject |
ddc:330 |
|
| dc.subject |
transparency |
|
| dc.subject |
reciprocity |
|
| dc.subject |
reputation |
|
| dc.subject |
gift exchange |
|
| dc.subject |
inequity aversion |
|
| dc.subject |
Arbeitsvertrag |
|
| dc.subject |
Agency Theory |
|
| dc.subject |
Nichtkooperatives Spiel |
|
| dc.subject |
Gerechtigkeit |
|
| dc.subject |
Experiment |
|
| dc.subject |
Theorie |
|
| dc.title |
Transparency and Reciprocal Behavior in Employment Relations |
|
| dc.type |
doc-type:workingPaper |
|