أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Filippin, Antonio
dc.date 2003
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:08:27Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:08:27Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20068
dc.identifier ppn:367379481
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20068
dc.description The paper explores the role of workers? expectations as an original explanation for the puzzling long run persistence of observed discrimination against some minorities in the labor market. A game of incomplete information is presented, showing that ex ante identical groups of workers may be characterized by unequal outcomes in equilibrium due to their different beliefs, even though discriminatory tastes and statistical discrimination by employers have disappeared. Wrong beliefs of being discriminated against are self-confirming in this circumstance, being the ultimate cause of a lower percentage of promotions which supports these wrong beliefs.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation IZA Discussion paper series 823
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject D84
dc.subject J24
dc.subject C79
dc.subject J15
dc.subject J71
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject discrimination
dc.subject workers? expectations
dc.subject self-confirming beliefs
dc.subject Arbeitsmarktdiskriminierung
dc.subject Ethnische Diskriminierung
dc.subject Dynamisches Spiel
dc.subject Unvollkommene Information
dc.subject Arbeitsproduktivität
dc.subject Erwartungstheorie
dc.subject Theorie
dc.title Discrimination and Workers' Expectations
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط