المستودع الأكاديمي جامعة المدينة

Foreign Direct Investment, Labour Market Regulation and Self-Interested Governments

أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Palokangas, Tapio
dc.date 2003
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:08:11Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:08:11Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20038
dc.identifier ppn:365983624
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20038
dc.description This document examines foreign direct investment (FDI) when multinationals and labour unions bargain over labour contracts and lobby the self-interested government for taxation and labour market regulation. We demonstrate that right-to-manage bargaining predicts higher returns for FDI than does non-unionization or efficient bargaining. This advantage is further magnified in the presence of credible wage contracts. When the labour market is nonunionized, or there is a bargain over employment, the ruling elite reaps the surplus of FDI through taxation or regulation. In the absence of credible contracts, unions have incentives to claim a bigger share of the revenue of FDI.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation IZA Discussion paper series 793
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject D78
dc.subject J51
dc.subject F23
dc.subject F21
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject foreign direct investment
dc.subject labour market regulation
dc.subject lobbying
dc.subject Direktinvestition
dc.subject Investitionsrisiko
dc.subject Multinationales Unternehmen
dc.subject Gewerkschaftlicher Organisationsgrad
dc.subject Lohnverhandlungstheorie
dc.subject Interessenpolitik
dc.subject Arbeitsmarktflexibilisierung
dc.subject Standortfaktor
dc.subject Theorie
dc.title Foreign Direct Investment, Labour Market Regulation and Self-Interested Governments
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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