| dc.creator |
Joosten, Reinoud |
|
| dc.date |
2005 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2013-10-16T07:08:07Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2013-10-16T07:08:07Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2013-10-16 |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20025 |
|
| dc.identifier |
ppn:495265225 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20025 |
|
| dc.description |
Two agents possess the fishing rights to a lake. Each period they have two options, to catch without restraint, e.g., to use a fine-mazed net, or to catch with some restraint, e.g., to use a wide-mazed net. The use of a fine-mazed net always yields a higher immediate catch than the alternative. The present catches depend on the behavior of the agents in the past. The more often the agents have used the fine- mazed net in the past, the lower the present catches are independent from the type of nets being used. We determine feasible rewards and provide (subgame perfect) equi- libria for the limiting average reward criterion using methods inspired by the repeated-games literature. Our analysis shows that a 'tragedy of the commons' can be averted, as sustainable Pareto-efficient outcomes can be supported by subgame perfect equilibria. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.publisher |
|
|
| dc.relation |
Papers on economics & evolution 0506 |
|
| dc.rights |
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen |
|
| dc.subject |
C73 |
|
| dc.subject |
C72 |
|
| dc.subject |
Q22 |
|
| dc.subject |
Q20 |
|
| dc.subject |
ddc:330 |
|
| dc.subject |
games with frequency-dependent stage payoffs |
|
| dc.subject |
limiting average reward |
|
| dc.subject |
equilibria |
|
| dc.subject |
renewable common-pool resources |
|
| dc.subject |
Allmenderessource |
|
| dc.subject |
Erneuerbare Ressourcen |
|
| dc.subject |
Nichtkooperatives Spiel |
|
| dc.subject |
Dynamisches Spiel |
|
| dc.subject |
Theorie |
|
| dc.title |
A small Fish War: an example with frequency-dependent stage payoffs |
|
| dc.type |
doc-type:workingPaper |
|