أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Joosten, Reinoud
dc.date 2005
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:08:07Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:08:07Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20025
dc.identifier ppn:495265225
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/20025
dc.description Two agents possess the fishing rights to a lake. Each period they have two options, to catch without restraint, e.g., to use a fine-mazed net, or to catch with some restraint, e.g., to use a wide-mazed net. The use of a fine-mazed net always yields a higher immediate catch than the alternative. The present catches depend on the behavior of the agents in the past. The more often the agents have used the fine- mazed net in the past, the lower the present catches are independent from the type of nets being used. We determine feasible rewards and provide (subgame perfect) equi- libria for the limiting average reward criterion using methods inspired by the repeated-games literature. Our analysis shows that a 'tragedy of the commons' can be averted, as sustainable Pareto-efficient outcomes can be supported by subgame perfect equilibria.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation Papers on economics & evolution 0506
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject C73
dc.subject C72
dc.subject Q22
dc.subject Q20
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject games with frequency-dependent stage payoffs
dc.subject limiting average reward
dc.subject equilibria
dc.subject renewable common-pool resources
dc.subject Allmenderessource
dc.subject Erneuerbare Ressourcen
dc.subject Nichtkooperatives Spiel
dc.subject Dynamisches Spiel
dc.subject Theorie
dc.title A small Fish War: an example with frequency-dependent stage payoffs
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط