| dc.creator |
Hakenes, Hendrik |
|
| dc.creator |
Schnabel, Isabel |
|
| dc.date |
2004 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2013-10-16T07:07:22Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2013-10-16T07:07:22Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2013-10-16 |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19894 |
|
| dc.identifier |
ppn:477634664 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19894 |
|
| dc.description |
The explicit or implicit protection of banks through government bail-out policies is a universal phenomenon. We analyze the competitive effects of such policies in two models with different degrees of transparency in the banking sector. Our main result is that the bail-out policy unambiguously leads to higher risk-taking at those banks that do not enjoy a bail-out guarantee. The reason is that the prospect of a bail-out induces the protected bank to expand, thereby intensifying competition in the deposit market and depressing other banks? margins. In contrast, the effects on the protected bank?s risk-taking and on welfare depend on the transparency of the banking sector. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.publisher |
|
|
| dc.relation |
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2004/12 |
|
| dc.rights |
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen |
|
| dc.subject |
L11 |
|
| dc.subject |
G28 |
|
| dc.subject |
G21 |
|
| dc.subject |
ddc:330 |
|
| dc.subject |
Government bail-out |
|
| dc.subject |
banking competition |
|
| dc.subject |
transparency |
|
| dc.subject |
"too big to fail" |
|
| dc.subject |
financial stability |
|
| dc.subject |
Bankrisiko |
|
| dc.subject |
Bank |
|
| dc.subject |
Risikofreude |
|
| dc.subject |
Unternehmenssanierung |
|
| dc.subject |
Einlagensicherung |
|
| dc.subject |
Wettbewerb |
|
| dc.subject |
Bankenkrise |
|
| dc.subject |
Theorie |
|
| dc.title |
Banks without Parachutes : Competitive Effects of Government Bail-out Policies |
|
| dc.type |
doc-type:workingPaper |
|