المستودع الأكاديمي جامعة المدينة

Nonlinear Incentive Provision in Walrasian Markets : A Cournot Convergence Approach

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dc.creator Hellwig, Martin
dc.date 2004
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:07:21Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:07:21Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19890
dc.identifier ppn:477629008
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19890
dc.description The paper studies insurance with moral hazard in a system of contingent-claims markets. Insurance buyers are modelled as Cournot monopolists or oligopolists. The other agents condition their expectations on market prices, as in models of rational-expectations equilibrium with asymmetric information. Thereby they correctly anticipate accident probabilities corresponding to effort incentives induced by insurance buyers? net trades. When there are many agents to share the insurance buyer?s risk, Cournot equilibrium outcomes are close to being second-best. In contrast, if insurance buyers are price takers, equilibria fail to exist or are bounded away from being second-best.
dc.language eng
dc.relation Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2004/8
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject Insurance
dc.subject Moral Hazard
dc.subject Incentive Contracting
dc.subject Walrasian Markets
dc.subject Rational-Expectations
dc.subject Cournot Equilibrium
dc.subject Versicherungsökonomik
dc.subject Moral Hazard
dc.subject Anreizvertrag
dc.subject Monopson
dc.subject Rückversicherung
dc.subject Optionsgeschäft
dc.subject Allgemeines Gleichgewicht
dc.subject Nash-Gleichgewicht
dc.subject Rationale Erwartung
dc.subject Theorie
dc.title Nonlinear Incentive Provision in Walrasian Markets : A Cournot Convergence Approach
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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