| dc.creator |
Rai, Ashok S. |
|
| dc.creator |
Klonner, Stefan |
|
| dc.date |
2007 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2013-10-16T07:07:15Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2013-10-16T07:07:15Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2013-10-16 |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19874 |
|
| dc.identifier |
ppn:560906315 |
|
| dc.identifier |
RePEc:zbw:gdec07:6541 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19874 |
|
| dc.description |
We investigate how well social collateral does as an alternative to traditional physical collateral. We do so by studying cosigned loans - a borrower´s loan is backed by the personal guarantee of a cosigner. We use a regression discontinuity approach with data from South Indian bidding Roscas. Our main finding is that cosigners do indeed provide social collateral: doubling the number of cosigners halves the probability of arrears for high risk borrowers. We then distinguish between different theories of social collateral. Cosigners may be e¤ective as a monitoring device (a borrower would pay to rid herself of the nuisance of a cosigner) or as an insurance device (a borrower would pay for the benefit of a cosigner). We show that these two interpretations of cosigning have different empirical predictions in the context of a bidding Roscas. We find support for the insurance role of cosigners. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.publisher |
|
|
| dc.relation |
Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Göttingen 2007 / Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics 18 |
|
| dc.rights |
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen |
|
| dc.subject |
G21 |
|
| dc.subject |
O16 |
|
| dc.subject |
D82 |
|
| dc.subject |
ddc:330 |
|
| dc.subject |
credit |
|
| dc.subject |
default |
|
| dc.subject |
cosigner |
|
| dc.subject |
rosca |
|
| dc.title |
Cosigners Help |
|
| dc.type |
doc-type:conferenceObject |
|