| dc.creator |
Hainz, Christa |
|
| dc.date |
2005 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2013-10-16T07:06:54Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2013-10-16T07:06:54Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2013-10-16 |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19811 |
|
| dc.identifier |
ppn:500758492 |
|
| dc.identifier |
RePEc:zbw:gdec05:3491 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19811 |
|
| dc.description |
The number of firm bankruptcies is surprisingly low in economies with poor institutions. We study a model of bank-firm relationship and show that the bank?s decision to liquidate bad firms has two opposing effects. First, the bank receives a payoff if a firm is liquidated. Second, it loses the rent from incumbent customers that is due to its informational advantage. We show that institutions must improve significantly in order to yield a stable equilibrium in which the optimal number of firms is liquidated. There is also a range where improving institutions may decrease the number of bad firms liquidated. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.publisher |
|
|
| dc.relation |
Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Kiel 2005 / Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics 18 |
|
| dc.rights |
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen |
|
| dc.subject |
G33 |
|
| dc.subject |
K10 |
|
| dc.subject |
G21 |
|
| dc.subject |
D82 |
|
| dc.subject |
ddc:330 |
|
| dc.subject |
Credit markets |
|
| dc.subject |
institutions |
|
| dc.subject |
bank competition |
|
| dc.subject |
information sharing |
|
| dc.subject |
bankruptcy |
|
| dc.subject |
relationship banking |
|
| dc.title |
Quality of Institutions, Credit Markets and Bankruptcy |
|
| dc.type |
doc-type:conferenceObject |
|