| dc.creator |
Fecht, Falko |
|
| dc.creator |
Tyrell, Marcel |
|
| dc.date |
2004 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2013-10-16T07:05:21Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2013-10-16T07:05:21Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2013-10-16 |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19506 |
|
| dc.identifier |
ppn:477279619 |
|
| dc.identifier |
RePEc:zbw:bubdp1:2917 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19506 |
|
| dc.description |
In a framework closely related to Diamond and Rajan (2001) we characterize different financial systems and analyze the welfare implications of different LOLR-policies in these financial systems. We show that in a bank-dominated financial system it is less likely that a LOLR-policy that follows the Bagehot rules is preferable. In financial systems with rather illiquid assets a discretionary individual liquidity assistance might be welfare improving, while in market-based financial systems, with rather liquid assets in the banks' balance sheets, emergency liquidity assistance provided freely to the market at a penalty rate is likely to be efficient. Thus, a "one size fits all"-approach that does not take the differences of financial systems into account is misguiding. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.relation |
Discussion paper Series 1 / Volkswirtschaftliches Forschungszentrum der Deutschen Bundesbank 2004,39 |
|
| dc.rights |
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen |
|
| dc.subject |
D52 |
|
| dc.subject |
E44 |
|
| dc.subject |
G21 |
|
| dc.subject |
E52 |
|
| dc.subject |
E58 |
|
| dc.subject |
ddc:330 |
|
| dc.subject |
Financial Crises |
|
| dc.subject |
Lender of Last Resort |
|
| dc.subject |
Comparing Financial Systems |
|
| dc.subject |
Lender of Last Resort |
|
| dc.subject |
Finanzmarkt |
|
| dc.subject |
Wirtschaftspolitische Wirkungsanalyse |
|
| dc.title |
Optimal lender of last resort policy in different financial systems |
|
| dc.type |
doc-type:workingPaper |
|