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What do deficits tell us about debt? Empirical evidence on creative accounting with fiscal rules in the EU

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dc.creator von Hagen, Jürgen
dc.creator Wolff, Guntram B.
dc.date 2004
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:05:19Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:05:19Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19505
dc.identifier ppn:477279244
dc.identifier RePEc:zbw:bubdp1:2916
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19505
dc.description Fiscal rules, such as the excessive deficit procedure and the stability and growth pact (SGP), aim at constraining government behavior. Milesi-Ferretti (2003) develops a model in which governments circumvent such rules by reverting to creative accounting. The amount of this creative accounting depends on the reputation cost for the government and the economic cost of sticking to the rule. In this paper, we provide empirical evidence of creative accounting in the European Union. We find that the SGP rules have induced governments to use stock-flow adjustments, a form of creative accounting, to hide deficits. This tendency to substitute stock-flow adjustments for budget deficits is especially strong for the cyclical component of the deficit, as in times of recession the cost of reducing the deficit is particularly large.
dc.language eng
dc.relation Discussion paper Series 1 / Volkswirtschaftliches Forschungszentrum der Deutschen Bundesbank 2004,38
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject H62
dc.subject H70
dc.subject H61
dc.subject E62
dc.subject H63
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject Fiscal rules
dc.subject stock-flow adjustments
dc.subject debt-deficit adjustments
dc.subject stability and growth pact
dc.subject excessive deficit procedure
dc.subject ESA 95
dc.subject EU-Stabilitätspakt
dc.subject Finanzpolitik
dc.subject Konvergenzkriterien
dc.subject Öffentliche Finanzkontrolle
dc.subject Öffentliches Rechnungswesen
dc.subject Öffentliche Schulden
dc.subject EU-Staaten
dc.title What do deficits tell us about debt? Empirical evidence on creative accounting with fiscal rules in the EU
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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