المستودع الأكاديمي جامعة المدينة

Welfare Implications of the Design of a Currency Union in Case of Member Countries of Different Sizes and Output Persistence

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dc.creator Frey, Rainer
dc.date 2004
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:05:12Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:05:12Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19482
dc.identifier ppn:391525131
dc.identifier RePEc:zbw:bubdp1:2160
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19482
dc.description In the study, the relevance of several optimum-currency-area (OCA) criteria is formally worked out in a welfare approach. The optimum monetary-policy rules of the supranational central bank are derived within the Barro-Gordon framework, and consideration is given to how the welfare of the member countries of a currency union is affected by symmetric and asymmetric national output shocks. The welfare implications are deduced both analytically and with the use of simulations. In a twocountry framework, the countries are allowed to differ in size, and different degrees of labour mobility are addressed. Also the issue of output persistence is taken up. The central-bank council may consist of a central-bank board and of a group of national central-bank presidents, where the national presidents are assumed to focus on their home economies. It is shown that relatively small member countries favour a situation where the group of national central bank presidents is in a strong position while large countries prefer decisions to be taken by the central-bank board. The preferences are the less strong the higher the degree of labour mobility. With output persistence, labour migration also moderates the disadvantages of the decisions taken by a central-bank board for a relatively small country. Furthermore, for output persistence in conjuncture with labour migration, monetary policy by a small country within the group of national presidents may negatively affect its future welfare. Besides, differences in the national monetary transmission processes as well as divergent national inflation and output preferences affect welfare.
dc.language eng
dc.relation Discussion paper Series 1 / Volkswirtschaftliches Forschungszentrum der Deutschen Bundesbank 2004,15
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject E61
dc.subject E52
dc.subject E58
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject monetary union
dc.subject voting power
dc.subject shocks
dc.subject output persistence
dc.subject monetary transmission process
dc.subject central bank council
dc.subject labour mobility
dc.subject Europäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion
dc.subject Zentralbank
dc.subject Abstimmung
dc.subject Macht
dc.subject Wohlfahrtseffekt
dc.subject Landesgrösse
dc.subject Konjunktur
dc.subject Hysteresis
dc.subject Theorie
dc.subject EU-Staaten
dc.title Welfare Implications of the Design of a Currency Union in Case of Member Countries of Different Sizes and Output Persistence
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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