Does Financial Integration Make Banks Act More Prudential? Regulation, Foreign Owned Banks, and the Lender-of-Last Resort

dc.creator	Berger, Helge
dc.creator	Hefeker, Carsten
dc.date	2006
dc.date.accessioned	2013-10-16T07:04:28Z
dc.date.available	2013-10-16T07:04:28Z
dc.date.issued	2013-10-16
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19367
dc.identifier	ppn:508580609
dc.identifier	RePEc:zbw:hwwadp:339
dc.identifier.uri	http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19367
dc.description	We analyze whether financial integration will lead to lower national regulation of domestic banking activities. In our model, banks? efforts and public regulation can lower the probability of bankruptcy. We contrast the national case with an integrated banking market and find that banks will exert greater effort to monitor their foreign activities. Thus, financial integration may increase prudential behavior and regulation. We also discuss incentives for banks to organize their foreign holdings in branches or subsidiaries. We show that the absence of a common lender of last resort can reduce the probability of financial crisis.
dc.language	eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation	HWWA Discussion Paper 339
dc.rights	http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject	E61
dc.subject	E58
dc.subject	F36
dc.subject	F33
dc.subject	E42
dc.subject	ddc:330
dc.subject	Bank regulation
dc.subject	lender of last resort
dc.subject	European financial markets
dc.title	Does Financial Integration Make Banks Act More Prudential? Regulation, Foreign Owned Banks, and the Lender-of-Last Resort
dc.type	doc-type:workingPaper

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