| dc.creator |
Ursprung, Heinrich W. |
|
| dc.date |
2002 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2013-10-16T07:04:24Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2013-10-16T07:04:24Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2013-10-16 |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19354 |
|
| dc.identifier |
ppn:349218781 |
|
| dc.identifier |
RePEc:zbw:hwwadp:26219 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19354 |
|
| dc.description |
Standard spatial models of political competition give rise to equilibria in which the competing political parties or candidates converge to a common position. In this paper I show how political polarization can be generated in models that focus on the nexus between pre-election interest group lobbying and electoral competition. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.publisher |
|
|
| dc.relation |
HWWA Discussion Paper 193 |
|
| dc.rights |
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen |
|
| dc.subject |
D72 |
|
| dc.subject |
ddc:330 |
|
| dc.subject |
political competition |
|
| dc.subject |
lobbying |
|
| dc.subject |
interest groups |
|
| dc.subject |
campaign contributions |
|
| dc.subject |
Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie |
|
| dc.subject |
Interessenpolitik |
|
| dc.subject |
Wahlkampffinanzierung |
|
| dc.subject |
Theorie |
|
| dc.title |
Lobbying and political polarization |
|
| dc.type |
doc-type:workingPaper |
|