| dc.creator |
Gale, Douglas |
|
| dc.creator |
Vives, Xavier |
|
| dc.date |
2002 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2013-10-16T07:04:15Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2013-10-16T07:04:15Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2013-10-16 |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19347 |
|
| dc.identifier |
ppn:346910994 |
|
| dc.identifier |
RePEc:zbw:hwwadp:26195 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19347 |
|
| dc.description |
Central bank policy suffers from time-inconsistency when facing a banking crisis : A bailout is optimal ex post but ex ante it should be limited to control moral hazard. Dollarization provides a credible commitment not to help at the cost of not helping even when it would be ex ante optimal to do so. Dollarization is good when the costs of establishing a reputation for the central bank are high, monitoring effort by the banker is important in improving returns, and when the cost of liquidating projects is moderate. However, a very severe moral hazard problem could make dollarization Undesirable. The results obtained are applied to assess the desirability of dollarization in a range of countries and the potential role of the IMF as International LOLR. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.publisher |
|
|
| dc.relation |
HWWA Discussion Paper 185 |
|
| dc.rights |
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen |
|
| dc.subject |
ddc:330 |
|
| dc.subject |
Währungssubstitution |
|
| dc.subject |
US-Dollar |
|
| dc.subject |
Geldpolitik |
|
| dc.subject |
Bank |
|
| dc.subject |
Kleines-offenes-Land |
|
| dc.subject |
Theorie |
|
| dc.title |
Dollarization, bailouts, and the stability of the banking system |
|
| dc.type |
doc-type:workingPaper |
|