| dc.creator |
Michaelowa, Katharina |
|
| dc.creator |
Borrmann, Axel |
|
| dc.date |
2004 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2013-10-16T07:04:02Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2013-10-16T07:04:02Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2013-10-16 |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19282 |
|
| dc.identifier |
ppn:481683208 |
|
| dc.identifier |
RePEc:zbw:hwwadp:26176 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19282 |
|
| dc.description |
Donor agencies invest considerable financial and human resources to evaluate the outcome of their development activities. To derive institutional conditions conducive to an efficient use of these resources, we develop a multi-level principal-agent model focusing on the various interests of the different actors involved in the evaluation process. The model highlights two central problems: (i) the aid agencies? conflicting objectives of transparency and self-legitimization, and (ii) the potential collusion between the evaluator and the project manager. Empirical evidence for the World Bank and different German donor agencies reveals concrete institutional requirements for a reduced evaluation bias and increased transparency. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.relation |
HWWA Discussion Paper 310 |
|
| dc.rights |
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen |
|
| dc.subject |
D73 |
|
| dc.subject |
F35 |
|
| dc.subject |
H43 |
|
| dc.subject |
ddc:330 |
|
| dc.subject |
Development cooperation |
|
| dc.subject |
evaluation |
|
| dc.subject |
political economy |
|
| dc.subject |
Entwicklungshilfe |
|
| dc.subject |
Entwicklungsorganisation |
|
| dc.subject |
Entwicklungsprojekt |
|
| dc.subject |
Projektbewertung |
|
| dc.title |
What Determines Evaluation Outcomes? Evidence from Bi- and Multilateral Development Cooperation |
|
| dc.type |
doc-type:workingPaper |
|