Default, Electoral Uncertainty and the Choice of Exchange Regime

dc.creator	Hefeker, Carsten
dc.date	2004
dc.date.accessioned	2013-10-16T07:03:59Z
dc.date.available	2013-10-16T07:03:59Z
dc.date.issued	2013-10-16
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19270
dc.identifier	ppn:47241304X
dc.identifier	RePEc:zbw:hwwadp:298
dc.identifier.uri	http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19270
dc.description	The paper explores the interaction between debt crises and devaluation. Since the optimal level of devaluation in a crisis depends on the level of debt that has to be serviced, a default makes a devaluation less likely. Expected devaluation depends thus on expectations about default which is also a function of the type of policymaker. Therefore, the decision to devalue can be forced upon the government by adverse expectations about default and the type of policymaker in office. I also explore how these uncertainties affect the policymaker?s choice of exchange rate regime.
dc.language	eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation	HWWA Discussion Paper 298
dc.rights	http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject	F34
dc.subject	F33
dc.subject	ddc:330
dc.subject	debt crisis
dc.subject	currency crisis
dc.subject	exchange rate regime
dc.subject	Finanzmarktkrise
dc.subject	Auslandsverschuldung
dc.subject	Zahlungsunfähigkeit
dc.subject	Wechselkurssystem
dc.subject	Public Choice
dc.subject	Währungskrise
dc.subject	Theorie
dc.title	Default, Electoral Uncertainty and the Choice of Exchange Regime
dc.type	doc-type:workingPaper

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