أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Sadiraj, Vjollca
dc.creator Tuinstra, Jan
dc.creator van Winden, Frans
dc.date 2006
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:03:18Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:03:18Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19162
dc.identifier ppn:510039421
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19162
dc.description Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that the presence of these interest groups increases the winning set, which is the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest groups enhance the probability of the challenger winning the election.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation CESifo working papers 1698
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject D72
dc.subject D71
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject spatial voting models
dc.subject electoral competition
dc.subject winning set
dc.subject interest groups
dc.subject Abstimmungsregel
dc.subject Interessenvertretung
dc.subject Wahlkampf
dc.subject Räumliche Interaktion
dc.subject Public Choice
dc.subject Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie
dc.title On the size of the winning set in the presence of interest groups
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط