Job security and work absence : evidence from a natural experiment

dc.creator	Lindbeck, Assar
dc.creator	Palme, Mårten
dc.creator	Persson, Mats
dc.date	2006
dc.date.accessioned	2013-10-16T07:03:14Z
dc.date.available	2013-10-16T07:03:14Z
dc.date.issued	2013-10-16
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19151
dc.identifier	ppn:510036902
dc.identifier.uri	http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19151
dc.description	We analyze the consequences for sickness absence of a selective softening of job security legislation for small firms in Sweden in 2001. According to our differences-in-difference estimates, aggregate absence in these firms fell by 0.2-0.3 days per year. This aggregate net figure hides important effects on different groups of employees. Workers remaining in the reform firms after the reform reduced their absence by about one day. People with a high absence record tended to leave reform firms, but these firms also became less reluctant to hire people with a record of high absence.
dc.language	eng
dc.relation	CESifo working papers 1687
dc.rights	http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject	J22
dc.subject	I38
dc.subject	H53
dc.subject	M51
dc.subject	J5
dc.subject	ddc:330
dc.subject	seniority rules
dc.subject	sick pay insurance
dc.subject	firing costs
dc.subject	moral hazard
dc.subject	Kündigungsschutz
dc.subject	Fehlzeit
dc.subject	Krankheit
dc.subject	Moral Hazard
dc.subject	Wirtschaftspolitische Wirkungsanalyse
dc.subject	Schweden
dc.title	Job security and work absence : evidence from a natural experiment
dc.type	doc-type:workingPaper

Files in this item

Files	Size	Format	View
There are no files associated with this item.