أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Brekke, Kurt R.
dc.creator Sørgard, Lars
dc.date 2006
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:03:08Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:03:08Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19143
dc.identifier ppn:510027075
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19143
dc.description This paper studies the interaction between public and private health care provision in a National Health Service (NHS), with free public care and costly private care. The health authority decides whether or not to allow private provision and sets the public sector remuneration. The physicians allocate their time (effort) in the public and (if allowed) in the private sector based on the public wage income and the private sector profits. We show that allowing physician dual practice "crowds out" public provision, and results in lower overall health care provision. While the health authority can mitigate this effect by offering a higher wage, we find that a ban on dual practice is more efficient if private sector competition is weak and public and private care are sufficiently close substitutes. On the other hand, if private sector competition is sufficiently hard, a mixed system, with physician dual practice, is always preferable to a pure NHS system.
dc.language eng
dc.relation CESifo working papers 1679
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject L33
dc.subject J42
dc.subject I18
dc.subject I11
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject health care
dc.subject mixed oligopoly
dc.subject physician dual practice
dc.subject Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung
dc.subject Gesundheitswesen
dc.subject Oligopol
dc.subject Privatwirtschaft
dc.title Public versus private health care in a national health service
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط