أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Englmaier, Florian
dc.creator Reisinger, Markus
dc.date 2006
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:03:05Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:03:05Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19134
dc.identifier ppn:510022723
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19134
dc.description The industrialization process of a country is often plagued by a failure to coordinate investment decisions. Using the Global Games approach we can solve this coordination problem and eliminate the problem of multiple equilibria. We show how appropriate information provision enhances efficiency. We discuss extensions of the model and argue that subsidies may be a property of a signalling equilibrium to overcome credibility problems in information provision. In addition we point out possible problems with overreaction to public information. Furthermore, we suggest a new focus for development policy.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation CESifo working papers 1670
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject C72
dc.subject F21
dc.subject D82
dc.subject O14
dc.subject O12
dc.subject C79
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject information
dc.subject coordination
dc.subject industrialization
dc.subject development
dc.subject global games
dc.subject equilibrium refinements
dc.subject big push
dc.subject Industrialisierung
dc.subject Investition
dc.subject Nichtkooperatives Spiel
dc.subject Investitionspolitik
dc.subject Entwicklungspolitik
dc.subject Gleichgewicht
dc.title Information, coordination, and the industrialization of countries
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط