Bureaucratic corruption and profit tax evasion

dc.creator	Goerke, Laszlo
dc.date	2006
dc.date.accessioned	2013-10-16T07:03:05Z
dc.date.available	2013-10-16T07:03:05Z
dc.date.issued	2013-10-16
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19130
dc.identifier	ppn:51002002X
dc.identifier.uri	http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19130
dc.description	Firms may evade taxes on profits and can also avoid fulfilling legal restrictions on production activities by bribing bureaucrats. It is shown that the existence of tax evasion does not affect corruption activities at the firm level, while the budgetary repercussions of tax evasion induce less corruption. Policy measures which alter the gains or losses from corruption have a nonsystematic impact on tax evasion behaviour.
dc.language	eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation	CESifo working papers 1666
dc.rights	http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject	D73
dc.subject	H26
dc.subject	H25
dc.subject	ddc:330
dc.subject	corruption
dc.subject	firms
dc.subject	tax evasion
dc.subject	Korruption
dc.subject	Unternehmensbesteuerung
dc.subject	Steuervermeidung
dc.subject	Steuerkriminalität
dc.subject	Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse
dc.subject	Theorie
dc.title	Bureaucratic corruption and profit tax evasion
dc.type	doc-type:workingPaper

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