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dc.creator Meland, Frode
dc.creator Straume, Odd Rune
dc.date 2006
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:03:01Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:03:01Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19122
dc.identifier ppn:51001738X
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19122
dc.description We study ex post outsourcing of production in an imperfectly discriminating contest, interpreted here as a research tournament or a procurement contest for being awarded some production contract. We find that the possibility of outsourcing increases competition between the contestants, leading to higher total contest effort, unless the ex-post bargaining strength of the contest winner is sufficiently low and/or there are very few contestants. However, even in the case of two contestants, outsourcing reduces the procurement costs of inducing a given level of effort if the contest organizer can collect entry fees. With respect to contest design, this suggests that outsourcing should generally be allowed if the objective is to induce stronger competition.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation CESifo working papers 1658
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject L24
dc.subject L23
dc.subject D44
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject contests
dc.subject outsourcing
dc.subject bargaining
dc.subject contest design
dc.subject Outsourcing
dc.subject Ausschreibung
dc.subject Wettbewerb
dc.subject Verhandlungstheorie
dc.subject Forschung
dc.subject Wohlfahrtseffekt
dc.subject Theorie
dc.title Outsourcing in contests
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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