المستودع الأكاديمي جامعة المدينة

Explaining conflict in low-income countries : incomplete contracting in the shadow of the future

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dc.creator McBride, Michael
dc.creator Skaperdas, Stergios
dc.date 2005
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:02:52Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:02:52Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19100
dc.identifier ppn:51000900X
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19100
dc.description We examine two factors that help explain the prevalence of conflict in low-income countries: that adversaries cannot enforce long-term contracts in arms, and that open conflict alters the future strategic positions of the adversaries differently than does peace. Using an infinite horizon model, we show the conditions under which adversaries will not be able to sustain short-term contracts even though doing so is Pareto superior to open conflict. Conflict arises because adversaries attempt to gain future strategic supremacy that only victory in conflict brings. Lower incomes or wages, as well as higher discount factors and the less destructive conflict is, the higher is the likelihood of war.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation CESifo working papers 1636
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject C70
dc.subject D74
dc.subject O10
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject Bürgerkrieg
dc.subject Politischer Konflikt
dc.subject Macht
dc.subject Rüstungspolitik
dc.subject Unvollständiger Vertrag
dc.subject Theorie
dc.subject Low-income Countries
dc.title Explaining conflict in low-income countries : incomplete contracting in the shadow of the future
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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