أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط

dc.creator Falch, Torberg
dc.creator Str?m, Bjarne
dc.date 2005
dc.date.accessioned 2013-10-16T07:02:51Z
dc.date.available 2013-10-16T07:02:51Z
dc.date.issued 2013-10-16
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19093
dc.identifier ppn:509894321
dc.identifier.uri http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19093
dc.description This paper analysis the link between political strength and public sector wages using a unique matched individual-employer data set for Norwegian local governments during the period 1990-1998. The results indicate that political strength, measured in several ways, has a positive effect on wages, while administrative strength, measured by the tenure of the chief executive, has a negative effect. The positive effect of political strength is consistent with a model in which the budgetary process is a multistage game and employment is determined in an interaction with interest groups prior to the wage bargain.
dc.language eng
dc.publisher
dc.relation CESifo working papers 1629
dc.rights http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject H72
dc.subject D73
dc.subject J45
dc.subject ddc:330
dc.subject public sector labor market
dc.subject wage bargaining
dc.subject political strength
dc.subject budgetary process
dc.subject Besoldung
dc.subject Lohnverhandlungstheorie
dc.subject Public Choice
dc.subject Macht
dc.subject Kommunalverwaltung
dc.subject Schätzung
dc.subject Norwegen
dc.title Wage bargaining and political strength in the public sector
dc.type doc-type:workingPaper


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أعرض تسجيلة المادة بشكل مبسط