| dc.creator |
Falch, Torberg |
|
| dc.creator |
Str?m, Bjarne |
|
| dc.date |
2005 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2013-10-16T07:02:51Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2013-10-16T07:02:51Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2013-10-16 |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19093 |
|
| dc.identifier |
ppn:509894321 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19093 |
|
| dc.description |
This paper analysis the link between political strength and public sector wages using a unique matched individual-employer data set for Norwegian local governments during the period 1990-1998. The results indicate that political strength, measured in several ways, has a positive effect on wages, while administrative strength, measured by the tenure of the chief executive, has a negative effect. The positive effect of political strength is consistent with a model in which the budgetary process is a multistage game and employment is determined in an interaction with interest groups prior to the wage bargain. |
|
| dc.language |
eng |
|
| dc.publisher |
|
|
| dc.relation |
CESifo working papers 1629 |
|
| dc.rights |
http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen |
|
| dc.subject |
H72 |
|
| dc.subject |
D73 |
|
| dc.subject |
J45 |
|
| dc.subject |
ddc:330 |
|
| dc.subject |
public sector labor market |
|
| dc.subject |
wage bargaining |
|
| dc.subject |
political strength |
|
| dc.subject |
budgetary process |
|
| dc.subject |
Besoldung |
|
| dc.subject |
Lohnverhandlungstheorie |
|
| dc.subject |
Public Choice |
|
| dc.subject |
Macht |
|
| dc.subject |
Kommunalverwaltung |
|
| dc.subject |
Schätzung |
|
| dc.subject |
Norwegen |
|
| dc.title |
Wage bargaining and political strength in the public sector |
|
| dc.type |
doc-type:workingPaper |
|